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Liberty Finds No Refuge in a
Jurisprudence of Doubt: The
Unconstitutional Use of Legislative History

in Construing. Pennsylvania Statutes.
I. Introduction
The Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees that no facially ambiguous
statute shall be construed by reference to legislative history, and that no
act of the legislature which admits more than one reasonable
interpretation shall bind the citizens of the Commonwealth. These
principles of individual liberty, although implicit, are clearly guaranteed
by the constitution and are in conflict with several provisions of the
Statutory Construction Act.' Because the Constitution is transcendent,
the mere age of the Statutory Construction Act cannot insulate it from
constitutional review.2 Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
held that any legislative attempt to dictate the construction of a statute
constitutes an unconstitutional infringement upon a fundamental
constitutional power of the judiciary.
The legislative power of Pennsylvania is vested in a General
Assembly, which is composed of a Senate and House of
Representatives. The Constitution also establishes parameters that bind
the exercise of legislative power. No law may be passed except by bill, 5
and no bill becomes law without majority approval in both houses of the
General Assembly6 and the assent of the Governor.7 Thus, a duly
passed law bears the imprimatur of both the legislative and executive
branches of government.

1. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1901-1991 (Supp. 1994).
2. The age of a statute cannot insulate it from attack when it is irreconcilable with
concepts of individual liberty. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 92 A.2d 272 (Pa. Super. 1952).
3. See generally PA. CONST. art. V, § 1. "The legislature can no more exercise judicial
powers than the courts can arrogate to themselves legislative powers[.] But the constitution of
1874, § 6, art. 3 ... requires all statutes to be self-explanatory and complete in their provisions;
and forbids the extensions, amendment, revival, or the use of any other method of conforming the
benefits of previous legislation short of a re-enactment at length." Titusville Iron-Works v.
Keystone Oil Co., 15 A. 917, 919 (Pa. 1889). Article ItI, section 6 of the 1874 constitution was
copied verbatim in the constitution of 1968. The court also noted that expository acts were not
uncommon prior to 1874, but that expository statutes under the new provision constitute "the
exercise of judicial powers by a department of the government that does not possess them." Id.
4.
PA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
5. Id. at art. III, § 1.
6. Id. at art. III, § 4.
7. Id. at art. IV, § 15. The General Assembly may also override the veto of the governor
by a two-thirds majority. Id.
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When a court is called upon to construe laws, it must construe the
language of bills passed by the General Assembly and subscribed by the
Governor. The constitution implicitly forbids the use of other legislative
materials, such as legislative journals, committee reports, transcripts of
hearings and statements of individual legislators to interpret ambiguous
terms. Yet Pennsylvania courts, like giant Saint Bemards lumbering to
the aid of fallen Alpine skiers, have carried casks of legislative history,'
limiting instructions, 9 and dubious public policy reasoning,"0 to rescue
Under the guise of "statutory
facially ambiguous statutes."
construction," Pennsylvania courts have assumed a law-making role
through creative construction of ambiguous statutes.
The interpretation of laws by legislative materials which have not
withstood the battery of constitutional tests established for the legislative
process is unconstitutional government. Such materials were never
intended under the Constitution to cure otherwise vacuous legislative
wording. Furthermore, the requirement that laws be passed by bill
presupposes that there be ascertainable substance to each bill-language
which when examined can yield only one interpretation. In order to
preserve the integrity of republican government in Pennsylvania, courts
must eschew the modem tendency to rely upon legislative histories and
other non-textual sources to construe statutory enactments, and they must
hold as invalid all ambiguous statutes.
This Comment will first discuss the roles of the legislative and
judicial branches under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Second, the
historical rejection of legislative histories for the purpose of statutory
construction will be outlined. Third, the power of Pennsylvania courts
to adopt rules of construction different from those used by the federal
courts will be examined. This discussion will be followed by a timely
example of the dangers of reliance upon legislative history. Finally, a
proposal will be advanced that courts should reject all statutes, both civil
and criminal, that cannot pass the traditional test of strict construction.

8. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290, 1294 (Pa. 1992) (looking to
statement of prime sponsor to ascertain meaning of rape-crisis confidentiality statute).
9. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morgan, 331 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1975) (stating that a statute
may be rescued from vagueness by an appropriate limiting instruction).
10. See, e.g., Board of Christian Educ. v. School Dist., 91 A.2d 372, 377 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1954) (following judicially recognized public policy of the Commonwealth that commercial
activities of charitable institutions are not excluded from taxation).
11. The legislature has given carte blanche to the courts to do this. See I PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1925 (directing that statutes should be interpreted so as to preserve
constitutionality).
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II. Legislative and Judicial Power Under the Pennsylvania
Constitution
Article III, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states, "No law
shall be passed, except by bill."' 2 This section of the Constitution does
not merely establish general guidelines, but articulates a mandatory
directive relating to the manner in which the General Assembly is
required to pass legislation. 3 This provision also prohibits documents
other than bills from assuming the power of legislation. For example,
even joint resolutions cannot carry the force of law. 4 Because joint
resolutions of the General Assembly do not constitute law, afortiori, the
various components loosely called legislative history should not carry the
weight of enacted legislation either. Furthermore, legislative history,
unlike joint resolutions, cannot even claim to have been passed by both
houses of the legislature. Legislative history is subject to no votes,
cannot be vetoed by the Governor, and may be largely unknown to most
actors in the legislative process. In sum, it sports none of the
authenticating marks of deliberative republican wisdom borne by all bills
passed into law.
The constitutional requirement that legislation be passed by bill
necessitates an inquiry into the nature of a bill as a legal document. In
general, a bill is the draft or form of an act presented to the
legislature. 5 A bill becomes an act when passed by both houses of the

12. PA. CONST. art. Ill § I.
13. Consumer Party of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 507 A.2d 323, 334 (Pa. 1986). In
discussing the prohibition of the substance of a law being so altered as to change its original
purpose, the Court further stated, "The language of Article III, section I as well as the
circumstances surrounding its adoption clearly reflects its mandatory quality." Id.
14. Scudder v. Smith, 200 A. 601, 604 (Pa. 1938). The court stated that "this 'joint
resolution' was not a bill and its adoption by the legislature and approval by the Governor did not
make it a law." Id. (emphasis in original)(citing Ex Parte Hague, 147 A. 220, 222 (N.J. Eq.
1929)). In Ex Parte Hague, the New Jersey court had stated, "A joint resolution adopted by a
state Legislature is not a law. It is of less solemnity than a law, and clearly distinguishable
therefrom..." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Scudder also quoted the opinion of the Third
Circuit in Sancho v. Valiente & Co., 93 F.2d 327, 329 (1937), which said, "The appellant,
however, contends that the word 'bill,' as used in the phrase 'no law shall be passed except by
bill,' means a proposal for a law and that a proposal for a law may be by bill or joint resolution;
but we cannot accede to this view." But see West Shore School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board, 626 A.2d 1131 (Pa. 1993) (holding that pursuant to Article III, section 9, a
concurrent resolution signed by the governor has the effect of law, although the resolution in and
of itself is not a law as contemplated under Article III, section 1, because resolutions do not
attempt to promulgate rules or create rights but merely enhance those which already exist).
15. See Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. 446, 450 (1856) (articulating
differences among bills, acts and laws). Black's Law Dictionary defines a legislative bill as the
"draft of a proposed law from the time of its introduction in a legislative body through all the
various stages in both houses." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
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legislature and becomes law if the executive takes no measures to prevent
it. 6
When the Constitution speaks of a 'bill,' such reference
indisputably is to the language in a physical document for which a
majority of the members of both legislative houses have voted and which
the Governor has subscribed. Thus, when courts are called upon to
review laws, such review must be confined to the language of bills that
the General Assembly have passed. 7
The wisdom of the Commonwealth is defined as the concurrence of
two deliberative bodies chosen by the populace at-large and the assent of
the Governor. Courts are not equipped with these constitutional policytesting tools and should not substitute their wisdom for that of the
legislature.'" Primary law-making power is vested in the legislature. 9
Courts do not sit in judgment on legislative wisdom, but rather on
legislative power.2" They must declare any act void that is adjudged to
be beyond the authority of the legislature, 2' but the courts should
invalidate standards of justice established by the legislature only if they
are contrary to the Constitution.22 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has

16. Southwark Bank, 26 Pa. at 450.
17. This standard of review applies only to statutory law. Common law should arise only
when the legislature has not spoken clearly. Therefore no great constitutional transgression exists
when a court departs from a prior common law doctrine. Such departure is contrary to the
principle of stare decisis, a self-imposed rule of judicial restraint. Although capricious, such a
departure is not tyrannical, as when a court disregards the clear interpretation of legislative
language duly enacted.
18. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. James J. Cochran Post No. 2351, 38 A.2d 250 (Pa. 1944)
(stating that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature in determining
wisdom of prohibitions on sale of liquor).
19. See generally PA. CONST. art. Ill.
20. See Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Thomas, 9 A.2d 727 (Pa. 1949) (stating that
courts cannot review wisdom of public policy enacted into statute by the legislature, but only the
power of the legislature to do so).
21. Kurtz v. City of Pittsburgh, 31 A.2d 257, 258-59 (Pa. 1943); see also Thornburgh v.
Lewis, 470 A.2d 952, 956 (Pa. 1983), stating, "This Court will refrain from resolving a dispute
where to do so would merely involve it in carrying out functions properly delegated to a separate
branch of government. We will not refrain from resolving a dispute which involves only an
interpretation of the laws of the Commonwealth, for the resolution of such disputes is our
Constitutional duty."
22. As the Court stated more than a century ago:
It is not for the judiciary or the executive department to inquire whether the
legislature has violated the genius of the government or the general principles of
liberty and the rights of man, or whether acts are wise and expedient or not; but
only whether it has transcended the limits prescribed for it by the Constitution. By
these alone is the power of that body bounded; that is the touchstone by which all
its acts are to be tested; there is no other. It would be a violation of first principles,
as well as their oaths of office, for the courts to enact any other standard.
Weister v. Hade, 52 Pa. 474, 478 (1866) (quoting language of Justice Caruthers of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, found in The Louisville and Nashville RailroadCo., LIVINGSTON's L. MAG.,
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even held that a court may not invalidate a statute on the ground that it
is contrary to principles of natural justice." Nevertheless, a limiting
corollary to this recognition of general policy-making authority in the
legislature dictates that the legislature may not encroach upon the
judiciary in the administration of justice.24
A constitution is without raison d'etre if it does not provide for
judicial enforcement of the separation of governmental powers established
therein.25 The courts should recognize the primacy of the General
Assembly in making law, but temper this recognition with the
fundamental principle of republican government -- that the legislature to
act within the boundaries of the constitution. In Pennsylvania, the
Constitution requires that the legislature have no power to act outside of
the language of duly enacted laws.
In contrast to the seemingly self-evident proposition that the laws of
a republic should emanate from the language of bills passed by its

June 1855, at 369).
23. "If the legislature should pass a law in plain, unequivocal and explicit terms within the
general scope of their constitutional power, I know of no authority in this government to
pronounce such an act void merely because, in the opinion of the judicial tribunals, it was
contrary to the principles of natural justice." Commonwealth v. M'Closkey, 2 Rawle 369, 373
(Pa. 1830). Such action "would be vesting in the court a latitudinarian authority which might be
abused, and would necessarily lead to collisions between the legislative and judicial departments,
dangerous to the well being of society, or at least, not in harmony with the structure of our ideas
of natural government. Justice is regulated by no certain or fixed standard, so that the ablest and
purest minds might sometimes differ with respect to it." Id.
24. Leahey v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1949). The Court also quoted the language of
Judge Penrose of the Philadelphia Orphans' Court, who stated in In Re American Banking and
Trust Company, 4 Pa. Dist. R. 757, 761:
There are some things ... beyond the power of the legislature, even irrespective of
constitutional restrictions. It cannot change the laws of nature, the properties of
numbers, or the meaning of words. It cannot modify an axiom. Water will not boil
at 110 degrees nor freeze at 52 degrees; twelve times twelve will always be on
hundred and forty-four; insufficient cannot be made the equivalent of sufficient; bad
the equivalent of good; and things which are not equal to the same thing, will not,
in spite of the most solemn enactment to the contrary, be equal to each other.
Id. at 578-79 (emphasis in original).
25. Kurtz, 31 A.2d at 259 (citations omitted). The court further quoted the words of Chief
Justice Gibson in De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, 20, who stated:
It is idle to say the authority of each branch [of the government] is defined and
limited in constitution, if there be not an independent power able and willing to
enforce the limitations. Experience proves that it is thoughtlessly but habitually
violated, and the sacrifice of individual right is too remotely connected with the
objects and contests of the masses to attract their attention.
The words of Chief Justice Gibson lend further credence to the assertion that the specific
requirement of legislation by bill inherent in Art. I11, §1, cl. 1, of the Pennsylvania Constitution is
an individual right which should be properly given greater protection under the Pennsylvania
Constitution than under the U.S. Constitution. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
1047
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legislature, the Pennsylvania General Assembly has placed its imprimatur
upon judge-made law disguised as legislative enactment through the
Statutory Construction Act.26
The Supreme Court itself has
acknowledged that it looks to the Act for guidance 27 and has even
expressed its subservience to it.2" But various provisions of the Act
have led to an unconstitutional shift of legislative power from the General
Assembly to the judiciary under the rubric of statutory construction. As
a practical concern, the danger of using legislative history is that a
subjective meaning may be attributed to language that is not apparent on
the face of the statute.29 When this occurs, the legislature, through an
agent of the judiciary, acts unconstitutionally. It seeks to bind the
citizens of the Commonwealth in a way other than through the language
of bills passed into law. Today, courts facilitate this unconstitutional
process when they look to legislative histories to construe statutes, in
contravention of historical precedent. In one case arising in the
nineteenth century, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that legislative
history was "not only of no value, but it was delusive and dangerous.3"
III. Historical Rejection of Legislative History in Construing
Pennsylvania Statutes
Powers granted to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were modeled
after the antecedent English courts of Common Pleas, Exchequer, and
King's Bench.3 ' Those courts did not presume to infuse ambiguous
language of an act of Parliament with definitional filler extracted from the
record of debates in Parliament. Rather, the English courts historically
forswore any use of parliamentary materials in the determination of a
statute's meaning.32 The classic statement of this rule was set forth in

26. See supra note 1.
27. Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Co., 614 A.2d 218, 219 (Pa. 1992).
28. Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 621 A.2d 990 (Pa. 1993).
29. Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized the problems of external evidence to infuse
ambiguous provisions with meaning. In his classic article, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,he
wrote, "[W]e ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a
normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used, and it is to
the end of answering this last question that we let in evidence as to what the circumstances were."
12 HARV. L REv. 417, 418 (1899).
30. Bank of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. (7 Harris) 144, 156 (1852) (approving
of the iower court's disregard of evidence of the proclamation and message of the governor, the
journals of the House of Representatives, and the reports of its committees).
31. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 2; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 502 (1981).
32. Kenneth W. Starr, ObservationsAbout the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L. J.
371, 374 (1987). But see William S. Jordan, Ill, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation:
the relevance of English practice, 29 UNIV. SAN. F. L. REV. 1-42 (1994) (citing the landmark
English case of Pepper v. Hart, I All E.R. 42 (H.L. 1993), articulating rules for the proper use of
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the 1769 case of Millar v. Taylor: "The sense and meaning of an Act of
Parliament must be collected from what it says whenpassed into law; and
not from the history of changes it underwent in the house where it took
rise. That history is not known to either house of to the Sovereign."33
American courts generally held to this view early in the nation's
history, but later departed from the practice of the English courts. The
proposition that laws should be construed solely according to their
language is not new. Rather, it is solidly grounded in historical
practice. 4 Yet somewhere along the legal time-line, the courts moved
away from statutory interpretation based on the understanding of the
language by an ordinary citizen, and toward an interpretation by methods
that are clouded in mystery and uncertainty.
In early Pennsylvania history, courts adhered to a method of
statutory construction that emphasized examination of the plain terms of
a statute to discern its intent. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
such a rule in the 1808 case of Commonwealth v. Messinger:
The intention of the lawmakers must be extracted from
their own expressions. The whole must be read together.
To every expression must be assigned its true meaning.
We have no power to insert and iterpolate on the one hand,
nor on the other to drop and reject a single word, in order
to make the act comport with our private sentiments. A
rational construction must be formed on the tout ensemble,
according to the apparent intention of the legislature as
expressedby themselves."
In the mid-Nineteenth Century, the Supreme Court again expressed
the primacy of language and categorically rejected examinations of
legislative history. The court forcefully stated, "It is true that the journals
[of each house] are not evidence of the meaning of a statute, because this
and the facts
must be ascertained from the language of the act itself,
36
operate.
to
is
it
which
on
subject
the
with
connected
parliamentary materials).
33. Star, supra note 32, at 374 (citing Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2332, 98 Eng. Rep..
201, 217 (1769), in turn cited in Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 527 (1947)).
34. Some authors have argued that the inter[n]ational disregard of legislative history works
well in parliamentary systems, but not in constitutional republics such as the United States. See,
e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Legislative History, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 441, 448 (1983); Jordan,
supra note 32. To my knowledge, no author has ever specifically addressed the possibility of a
textual prohibition in the Pennsylvania Constitution against the use of legislative history to
construe Pennsylvania statutes.
35. 1 Binn. 272, 278 (Pa. 1808) (Yeates, J.)(emphasis in original).
36. Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa (2 Casey) 446, 450 (1856).
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Early in the Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court reiterated the
substance of this plain language approach to interpretation.
[I]t is the legislative intent that governs in all statutory
construction, but ... courts in seeking for the legislative
intent must find it in the statute itself ... [U]nless good

ground can be found in the statute for restraining or
enlarging the meaning of its words the courts may not
subtract therefrom or add thereto. Another equally
fundamental rule overlooked is, that were the words of a
statute are plain and clearly 37define its scope and limit,
construction cannot extend it.

Some vestiges of the original rule survive in the modem Statutory
Construction Act.38
This Act, like the principles of construction
originally followed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, dictates that
courts should not depart from the plain and literal meaning of the words
contained in legislative enactments out of deference to some supposed
intent, or absence of intent, that would prevent the application of the
words actually used in a given subject.39 Such a practice substitutes the
theories of a court that may, and often do, vary with the personality of
the individuals who compose it, in place of the express words of the law
as enacted by the law-making power." Such practice is an usurpation
of legislative power, and contrary to the Pennsylvania Constitution, which
vests primary legislative power in the General Assembly.4 I Yet courts
in the late twentieth century have moved away from the original purity
of judicial interpretation. Determination of legislative intent is no longer
confined to the language of statutes generally enacted, but may include
arcane research into sources other than the language of the text. Judicial
opinions which rely upon intensive scrutiny of the journals of the house

37. Grayson v. Aiman, Inc., 252 Pa. 465, 466 (1916).
38. See I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(b) (stating that when the words of a statute are clear
and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing
its spirit); see also Commonwealth v. Bay State Milling Co., 167 A. 307 (Pa. 1933), overruled
on different grounds, Bouse v. Hull, 176 A.2d 645 (Pa. 1962); Marsh v. Groner, 102 A. 127, 129
(Pa. 1917) (stating that statutes are presumed to employ words in their popular sense, and when
the words used are susceptible of more than one meaning, the popular meaning will prevail).
39. City of Pittsburgh v. Kalcthaler, 7 A. 921, 922 (Pa. 1887).
40. Id. The Court further noted that such was "a practice to be avoided and not followed,"
and that such a path "is a devious and dangerous one, which ought never to be trodden, except
upon considerations of the most convincing character and the gravest moment." It is questionable
whether Pennsylvania courts today apply the "most convincing character" and "gravest moment"
test before departing from the plain and literal meaning of a legislative enactment. Id.
41. See generally PA. CONST. art Ill.
1050

LIBERTY FINDS

No

REFUGE

and senate can 42leave an ordinary citizen in utter confusion as to the
dictates of law.
The constitutional provision that "[n]o law shall be passed except by
bill," is a restraint on the power of the General Assembly to act other
than through unambiguous language. It requires that citizens be able to
challenge statutes that are not applied according to the meaning of their
unambiguous language. Ambiguous statutes can be given no effect.
External legislative aids to interpretation, such as legislative histories,
should be rejected as not within the language of a "bill" passed by both
houses of the General Assembly and signed by the Governor. If the
ambit and meaning of a law cannot be reasonably deduced from its face
or when read in conjunction with other law, the courts should invalidate
such a law as unconstitutionally vague. This guarantee is indispensable
to the republican form of government outlined in the Pennsylvania
Constitution. The presumption of courts in construing statutes should not
be one of constitutionality,4 3 but of individual liberty.44
IV. The Role of the Pennsylvania Constitution within the Federal
Structure
The Constitution of the United States guarantees to every state a
republican form of government.45 In a republic, the primary maker of
laws should be an elected legislative body.46 Moreover, the laws passed

42. Judicial dissection of legislative histories sometimes borders on the mystical. See
Schneck v. City of Philadelphia, 383 A.2d 227, 230-33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978)(Crumlish, J.,
dissenting opinion) (incorporating review of legislative history at lower court for proposition that
Commonwealth had completely preempted local regulation of the acquisition and transfer of
firearms in Philadelphia).
43. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1925.
44. For a very interesting critique of prevailing presumptions in the realm of statutory
construction, see David M. Burke, The "Presumptionof Constitutionality" Doctrine and the
Rehnquist Court: a lethal combinationfor individual liberty, 18 HARV. J. OF LAW & PUB. POL.
73-173 (1994).
45. Article IV, § 4 of the United States Constitution states:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government and shall protect each of them against Invasion, and on Application of
the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic violence.
46. A republic is "a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the
great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for
a limited period, or during good behaviour." THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison). "[A]
republican government is that in which the body, or only a part of the people, is possessed of the
supreme power[.]" Le Baron de Montesquieu, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, BOOK II, c. 1. The
distinguishing feature of the republican form of government is the right of the people to choose
their own officers for governmental administration and pass their own laws. In re Duncan, 139
U.S. 449 (1891).
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by an elected legislature must be ascertainable by the ordinary citizen.
Indeed, due process requires that all citizens be informed as to what the
state commands or forbids,47 and penal legislation is specifically
bounded by the United States Supreme Court's prohibition that "men of
common intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the
criminal law."4
A system of obscure and ambiguous laws whose
meaning cannot be reasonably ascertained is contrary to the spirit of a
republican government. Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt.4 9
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the
States are not only free to, but also encouraged to, engage in independent
analysis in drawing meaning from their own state constitutions.5" The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated with increasing frequency that it
is both important and necessary that the courts undertake an independent
analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution when a provision of that
document is implicated." Although Pennsylvania courts may accord
weight to federal decisions where they are logically persuasive and well
reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying
specific constitutional guarantees,52 Pennsylvania courts are free to reject
the conclusions of the United States Supreme Court, so long as they
remain faithful to the minimum guarantees established by the United
States Constitution. 3
This Comment proposes that the Pennsylvania Constitution mandates
an approach to statutory construction that differs from the prevailing
practice of the federal courts. But such an approach is not inconsistent
with the power of the States and their governments within the American
federal system. State constitutions may serve as the fonts of rights and
afford more protection to individuals than the federal constitution,54 and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized this principle. 5 While
47. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
48. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
49. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, _ U.S. _, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992) (plurality
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ.).
50. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (Pa. 1991) (citing Prune Yard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-82 (1980)(Rehnquist, J.)).
51. Id. at 894-95.
52. Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Pa. 1987) (quoting William Brennan,
Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 502
(1977)).
53. Edmunds, 535 A.2d at 895.
54. "State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law." See
Brennan supra note 52, at 502.
55. See Commonwealth v. Triplett, 341 A.2d 62 (1975) (holding that prohibition against

1052

LIBERTY FINDS No REFUGE

not an individual right under the classical paradigm of fundamental rights
to free speech, religion, press, et cetera, the right of a citizen to definite,
ascertainable legal standards is so elementary to republican government
that it should be considered a right expressed under state constitutions.
Pennsylvania courts are free to apply stricter standards to state laws than
federal courts apply to federal laws.56 Upon close examination of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, it is clear that Pennsylvania courts not only
may apply stricter standards of review to state legislation than those used
by the federal courts, they must apply stricter standards of review.
The traditional rules of statutory construction in Pennsylvania would
dictate that when a court construes a statute, it must analyze and interpret
it with the goal of ascertaining and giving effect to the intent of the
General Assembly. 7 Moreover, a statute must be construed as to give
effect to all of its provisions. 8 A court must follow the letter of the
statute if its words are unambiguous,5 9 but when the words are not
explicit, the court must ascertain the intent of the General Assembly by
looking to a series of factors."'
These canons of construction, although developed by the courts over
many years and expressly approved by the General Assembly, are at odds
with the dictates of the constitution, which states that "[n]o law may be
passed but by bill." A bill is a bill is a bill, and nothing else. No other
part of the legislative record possesses the proven constitutional wisdom
of enacted legislation, and the courts' reliance upon anything other than
existing law to construe new legislation is constitutionally impermissible

use of constitutionally infirm statements to impeach the credibility of a criminal defendant
testifying on his own behalf is found in Article I, section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution);
Edmunds, 535 A.2d at 1038 (holding that Pennsylvania Constitution precludes a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule).
56. This does not necessarily mean that the approach to statutory interpretation advocated
herein must be applied to enactments of the United States Congress. The argument of this
Comment is grounded primarily in Pennsylvania constitutional law. There are however certain
principles of republican government which might support a stricter review of federal statutes by
the federal courts.
57. Frontini v. Commonwealth Dept. of Trans., 593 A.2d 410, 411-12 (Pa. 1991); Freeze
v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 602 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (citing I PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1921(a) (Supp. 1994)).
58. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(a) (Supp. 1994).
59. Commonwealth v. Harner, 617 A.2d 702, 705-6 (Pa. 1992) (citing Commonwealth v.
Larking, 542 A.2d 1324, 1328; Commonwealth v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1172, 1175 (Pa. 1986); 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(b) (Supp. 1994).
60. Harner, 617 A.2d at 705-6 (citing I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c) (Supp. 1994)
and factors therein).
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because such practice effectively gives legislative history the force of
61
law.
In this regard, several provisions of the Statutory Construction Act
are consistent with the individual right not to be bound by ambiguous
statutes whose interpretation depends upon legislative history. These
provisions are effective not because they are passed by the legislature, but
because they are consistent with principles of construction imposed by the
Constitution. Rules that require the construction of statutes in reference
to the language of other laws passed by the legislature are within the
constitutional mandate that no law be passed except by bill, provided that,
in toto, only one reasonable interpretation can be deduced from the
resultant legal corpus. Such rules dictate, for example, that statutes in
pari materia should be construed together,62 that particular provisions
of a statute should control general provisions,6 3 and that references to
statutes and regulations include any amendments or additions thereto
absent an express intent to the contrary.64 Moreover, a fundamental and
indisputable tenet of republican political theory requires that were two
provisions or statutes are irreconcilable, the latter expression of the
legislature will control.65
But as noted already, some rules are clearly at odds with the
constitutional mandate: the use of external sources (as opposed to the
language of the bill) to ascertain the intention of the General
Assembly, 66 the use of a split standard of construction (liberal versus
strict) based on the substance of the law in question, 67 and the use of
comments and reports in construing statutes. 68 Also, the rule that a

61. Courts may look to the common law, because the common law, although uncodified,
provides essential definitions and structures for the legal system contemplated by the
Pennsylvania Constitution. The common law may supply definitions where the legislature has
not, but courts should not create bastardized common law resulting from an unholy alliance of
ambiguous legislative acts and judicial pronouncements.
62. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1932 (Supp. 1994).
63. Id. at § 1993.
64. Id. at § 1937.
65. See I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1934-1936 (Supp. 1994).
66. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (c).
67. Id. at § 1928.
68. Id. at § 1939; Commonwealth v. French, 611 A.2d 175 (Pa. 1992) (holding that use of
Official Comment to Crimes Code is proper where it was available to the General Assembly five
years before the Crimes Code was enacted); see also In re Martin's Estate, 74 A.2d 120 (Pa.
1950) (looking to comments of commission, which drafted ambiguous acts, for guidance in
interpretation thereof); National Transit Co. v. Boardman, 197 A. 239 (Pa. 1938).
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statute should be construed to sustain its validity,69 while not per se
unconstitutional, can be used improperly.7"
Article III, section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution requires
judicial disregard not only of legislative history, but also of duly passed
laws that impose a certain construction of a statute upon the courts. 7'
The language of Article III, section 6 first appeared in the constitution of
1874 and was retained in the constitution of 1968. As interpreted by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that section prohibits the General Assembly
from passing expository acts and acts that direct the courts how to
construe previous legislation.72 Such practice was not uncommon prior
to 1874, and although courts pronounced all such legislation to be judicial
in character and void as to any retroactive effect, they nevertheless sought
to give effect to the legislative will expressed in those acts in future
cases. 73 Under the current language contained in Article III, section 6,
it is clear that all expository legislation is absolutely void.
For this reason, the Statutory Construction Act, a general expository
act, is clearly unconstitutional. The General Assembly cannot limit or
mandate to the courts any construction of bills passed by it, even by way
of separate legislation that imposes mandates upon the courts. Article III,
section 6 requires all statutes to be self-explanatory and complete in their
provisions, and it forbids the extension, amendment, revival, or the use
of any other method of conforming the benefits of other legislation short
of a reenactment at length.74 The General Assembly should pass new
bills to alter the construction of existing law, rather than directing the
judiciary to do so. Expository acts are void under Article III, section

69. Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 347 A.2d 290, 297 (Pa. 1975); 1 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1922 (b) (Supp. 1994).
70. If used as an axiom of reason, e.g. synonymous with the requirement that the
legislature not intend an irrational or absurd result, then this rule passes constitutional muster.
The Pennsylvania Constitution cannot operate unless construed according to the rules of classical
logic as a starting point: A equals A; A cannot equal non-A, etc. If one law states that a person
who sells one ounce of marijuana to another person is guilty of a misdemeanor, and another law
states no person who sells one ounce of marijuana to another person shall be guilty of a crime,
one of these (or both) must be invalid. Courts cannot construe the statutes so as to require the
impossible--find a person both guilty and not guilty of a misdemeanor. The limiting rule of
reason must apply. See Leahey v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1949). The danger is that judges,
acting under the guise of this rule, will narrow otherwise unconstitutional laws according to their
own notions of what constitutes the non-absurd or rational result.
71. PA. CONST. art. III, section 6 states, "No law shall be revived, amended, or the
provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is
revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be re-enacted ad published a length."
72. Titusville Iron-Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 15 A. 917, 919 (Pa. 1889).
73. Id.
74. Id.
1055
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Judicial reliance upon legislative history further violates the
Constitution because it acts as a concession of interpretive power to the
legislature.76 The Statutory Construction Act unconstitutionally dictates
to the courts how to define legislation in defiance of the constitutional
mandate that a statute be construed according to its terms. This Act
unconstitutionally contravenes the separation of powers established by the
constitution." It is for the courts to declare the meaning of an act of
the legislature.7 8 The legislature does not interpret its own enactments
and cannot mandate the means by which the judiciary should reach an
end.
Judicial abuse of legislative history at the federal level has been
criticized for reasons that resonate in any constitutional republic. In the
case of Blanchard v. Bergeron,79 the United States Supreme Court
considered the awarding of attorneys' fees under a section of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, s° and in construing the
statute looked to the Senate and House of Representatives committee
reports pertaining to the Act and cases cited therein to determine
congressional intent behind the law. Justice Scalia rebelled against the
majority opinion's statement that referenced judicial decisions in
congressional reports as reflective of congressional intent. Moreover, the
Justice warned of the danger of using committee reports in today's world:
As anyone familiar with modem-day drafting of
congressional committee reports is well aware, the
references to the cases were inserted, at best by a
committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and
at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of
a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was
not primarily to inform the Members of Congress what the
bill meant. . but rather to influence judicial construction.
What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to
know that his or her citation of obscure district court cases
can transform them into the law of the land, thereafter
dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court itself."1

75. Id.
76. Any part of the legislative history, by definition, does not bear the same authenticating
marks of deliberative republican wisdom which, absent Article Ill, section 6, even expository acts
bear.
77. Compare PA. CONST. art. V (vesting judicial power in the courts) with PA. CONST. art.
II (vesting legislative power in the General Assembly).
78. In re East Grant Street, 16 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa. 1888).
79. 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
80. Pub. L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
81. 489 U.S. at 98-99 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
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Justice Scalia also questioned the Supreme Court's reliance upon the
doctrine that if the legislative history of an enactment reveals a clearly
expressed legislative intention contrary to the enactment's language, the
Court is required to question the strong presumption that Congress
expresses its intent through its chosen language.8 2 Although both the
modem Pennsylvaniajudiciary and legislature have expressly rejected this
notion, stating that the clear language of a statute is not to be discarded
in favor of pursuing its spirit,
Pennsylvania courts have frequently
attempted to reconstruct legislators' intentions in other contexts. These
attempts work injustice on the populace at-large, because law emanating
from the legislature is no longer confined to the rigorous process of bills
that have been duly passed. A court may use a legislator's voice from
the House floor, a staff member's interpretation of a prior printer's
number of a bill, or testimony given at a public hearing to act in a
legislative, rather than judicial, capacity. A carefully chosen sound bite
from legislative history can significantly alter the legal landscape for
years thereafter. The possibility of legislative repeal is not a sufficient
safeguard from this judicial activism because some actors in the
legislative process may have supported the original bill language precisely
because it was vague, and any adverse interpretation of it by the judiciary
could be kept at a safe political distance from their votes.
Justice Scalia has said that the federal judges should interpret laws
rather than try to reconstruct legislators' intentions.84 Similarly, when
Pennsylvania courts rely upon legislative histories to interpret otherwise
ambiguous statutes, they no longer construe law, but create it.
V. Contemporary Problems Created by Judicial Use of Legislative
History
In the 1972 case of Commonwealth v. Wilson, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court noted that "[s]tatements made by legislators during the
enactment process are not dispositive of legislative intent,"85 but that
they nevertheless "may properly be considered as part of the
contemporaneous legislative history."8 6 This is a double standard and

82. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987).
83. See, e.g., Gutman v. Worldwide Ins. Co., 630 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993);
Freeze v. Donegal Mutual Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (citing factors
contained in I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 192 1(b) (Supp. 1994) used for ascertaining intent of the
General Assembly).
84. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 452-53.
85. 602 A.2d 1290, 1294 (Pa. 1992) (citing Commonwealth v. Alcoa Prop., 269 A.2d 748,
750, n. 1 (1970)).
86. Wilson, 602 A.2d at 1294 (citing I Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921 (c) (7); South
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bad jurisprudence. Judges should instead follow the rule articulated by
Justice Holmes, that a statute should be construed according to the
meaning that would be given to it by an average English-speaker living
at the time of enactment. 87 Courts should disregard any unusual
definitions which might appear in legislative history, but which are not
clear from the language enacted.
It is doubtful that a legislator's opinion of the meaning of a word (if
not enacted in a definitional section along with the statute or otherwise
clear from the language of the statute itself) is any more relevant to
determining the objective meaning of a word or phrase than is that of the
owner of a butcher's shop located three blocks from the Capitol in
downtown Harrisburg. If any meaning can be drawn from legislative
debate, it is the subjective meaning given by the sponsor of the bill, and
this meaning most likely imports some bias away from the commonly
attributed definition. Even if all legislators are in agreement with any
proffered definition, if that intended definition is not in accord with the
common definition of the word and not otherwise clear from the bill
itself, then the citizenry is not on notice of its meaning-- a result that
violates the fundamental republican principle that persons of ordinary
intelligence be able to discern what the law requires.8" Ambiguous laws
do not apprise reasonable citizens of their rights under the law even if
legislative history expresses unanimous sentiment of the legislative actors,
and the courts must hold such laws unconstitutional.
Contemporaneous dictionaries and documents of general circulation,
as well as legal or political writings on topics other than the legislation
in question, are useful to determine the meaning of statute. These
documents are presumably written with no bias toward the definition of

Whitehall Twp. Police Service v. South Whitehall Twp., 555 A.2d 793, 796-97 (Pa. 1989).
87. Oliver Wendell Holmes stated almost a century ago the proper inquiry for a judge
construing a statute:
A word generally has several meanings, even in the dictionary. You have to
consider the sentence in which it stands to decide which of those meanings it bears
in the particular case, and very likely will see that it has a shade of significance
more refined than any given in the word-book ....
Even the whole document is
found to have a certain play in the joints when its words are translated into things
by parol evidence, as they have to be. It does not disclose one meaning
conclusively according to the laws of language. Thereupon we ask, not what this
man meant, but what those words would mean in the mount of a normal speaker of
English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used, and it is to the
end of answering this last question that we let in evidence as to what the
circumstances were.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory ofLegal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417-18
(1899).
88. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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a word in a given bill, and they are reliable indicators of objective
meaning, unlike statements in the legislative history of a bill. 9
At issue in the case of Commonwealth v. Wilson9" was whether an
enactment of the General Assembly was meant to provide complete
confidentiality for a rape victim's communications with a counselor. The
court looked to a statement submitted for the legislative record by State
Representative Alden,9' which referred unfavorably to a previous
decision of the Court, 92 and emphasized the need for legislation to
overrule that decision so that counseling relationships would not be
inhibited. Representative Alden stressed in his statement the need to
"reverse the court's ruling and to provide complete confidentiality for
rape victims and counselors." 93
From this language the Court
determined that the legislature had intended to reverse the effect of its
earlier decision.9 4
Real litigants with real interests were affected by the Court's foray
into the dusty journals of the Pennsylvania General Assembly in Wilson.
One party should not prevail and another lose on the basis of language
nowhere in either statutory or common law. Yet sometimes, especially
in the area of private law, the rights of two parties are contested under an
ambiguous statute. If the positive law supplies no answer to a given case,
the court should weigh the equities of the case and fashion a response to
it. The court should not feel at all bound by unenacted language uttered
in the heat of the legislative process. The average citizen does not
reasonably expect to be bound by an utterance of an individual legislator
on the floor of the House or Senate, but only by language approved by
the legislature as a whole. Once a statute is deemed constitutionally
deficient in expression of meaning, the Commonwealth is on notice that
it should not be given reliance. The citizenry can act as if it were never
passed.
In one very unusual case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has used
legislative history to determine whether the interest of a litigant

89. In fact, legislative history may be specifically manipulated in an attempt to dictate a
judicial construction in the presence of an ambiguity. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
When the language of an enactment is ambiguous and a singular reasonable meaning cannot be
deduced from the language of the bill, the courts should prospectively invalidate so much of the
statute that is ambiguous. It is now the responsibility of the general assembly to enact new
legislation with an ascertainable meaning.
90. 602 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 1992).
91. Pa. Leg. J., House 1738-39 (Oct. 14, 1981).
92. In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A.2d 126 (1981).
93. Pa. Leg. J., House 1738-39 (Oct. 14, 1981).
94. The Court also noted that the legislature had rejected a proposal which would have
included the very procedure established in Pittsburgh Action. Wilson, 602 A.2d at 295 n.7.
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implicated by a statutory enactment was sufficient to establish standing
to seek injunctive relief from its implementation. 9 The legislation
under attack would have prohibited the establishment of a quota system
for the issuance of traffic citations, tickets, or any other citations. 96 The
court looked to the statements of two members of the House of
Representatives and determined that the interests of the litigants before
the Court were intended to be within the zone of interests implicated by
the legislation, and therefore had.an interest in the litigation. 97
It seems especially odd that the Supreme Court would feel
compelled to rely upon legislative history to determine whether an
element of justiciability, standing, would be met. The doctrine of
standing is almost exclusively a development of common law, which
arises out of purely judicial determinations.98 Thus, judicial reliance
upon legislative history in this area is puzzling. Yet it is indicative of the
often irrational deference which courts show to legislative history.
A timely example of the sheer absurdity that can result from the use
of legislative history is found in the recent case of Becker v. Harple.99
In Becker, the court considered the 'serious injury' provision under the
Limited Tort Amendment in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Insurance
Act.' 0
In summary, the law allows a purchaser of automobile
insurance to elect one of two options for insurance coverage: "full tort"
or "limited tort." The "full tort" alternative allows persons to seek
compensation for noneconomic loss claimed and economic loss sustained
in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another

95. South Whitehall Twp. Police v. South Whitehall Twp., 555 A.2d 786-97 (Pa. 1989).
96. Id. at 794, 796-97 (construing 1981 Pa. Laws 321, No. 114 §§ 1-2, amended by 71 PA.
STAT. §§ 2001-2002).
97. Id.
98. "Generally, in order to have standing, a party must have an interest in the controversy
that is distinguishable from the interest shared by other citizens. To surpass that common
interest, the interest must be substantial, direct and immediate." Sierra Club v. Hartman, 605
A.2d 309, 310 (Pa. 1992) (quoting Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184, 187 (Pa. 1988)); see also
William Penn Parking Garage Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975).
The most notable exception to the standing rule, the taxpayer exception, is predicated on
the assumption that if such an exception were not recognized, a large body of governmental
activity would be unchallenged in the courts. Application of Biester, 409 A.2d 848, 851 n.5 (Pa.
1979) (quoting Note, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895, 904 (1960);
Faden v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 227 A.2d 619, 621-22 (Pa. 1967)).
99. 74 Lanc. L. Rev. 80 (C.P. 1994). As of the date that this Comment was written, no
appellate court in Pennsylvania had considered the question of interpretation of this statute.
100. The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 17011799.7 (Supp. 1994). Becker is not the only example of this approach to the Limited Tort
Amendment, but it is the most illustrative. See also Cunningham v. Clarke, 139 Pitts. L.J. 336
(1991); Kuma v. Carly, 73 Wash. Co. R. 72 (1992).
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person pursuant to applicable tort law.'' Under the "limited tort"
alternative, any action for noneconomic loss (e.g., pain and suffering) is
generally prohibited unless the injury is "serious."'0 2 The Act contains
an extensive list of definitions and defines "serious injury" as "[a]
personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function
or permanent serious disfigurement."' 0'3 This definition admits of
numerous interpretations, and no one interpretation is clear. The
provision of the "serious injury" definition pertaining to "serious
impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement" does
not offer any real assistance to a court which seeks to apply the statute.
The Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas in Becker stated that
the language of the statute in question was "obviously, ambiguous."'0 4
The court nevertheless tried to infuse meaning into the phrase. The
resulting analysis and holding, which concluded that the phrase should be
construed by the trier of fact, is the result of a tortuous examination of
Michigan case law. Although the Becker opinion represents a herculean
effort of legal research, it is an unconstitutional method of statutory
construction. The court engaged in judicial legerdemain that, though
flawless under the canons of statutory construction, did not entail an
examination of the "bill" as passed by both houses of the General
Assembly and signed by the Governor. Instead of declaring a facially
ambiguous statute void, the court went to the legislative history of
another state to find a meaning. In defiance of principles of republican
government, Pennsylvania courts sometimes declare statutes ambiguous,
but then seek to construe them anyway.' °
In Becker the court noted that the language of the Pennsylvania
Limited Tort Amendment relating to the definition of "serious injury" had
06
been copied verbatim from the Michigan No-Fault Insurance Act.
The Becker court therefore looked to the Michigan case law which had
construed the Michigan statute prior to its adoption in Pennsylvania and
drew on that body of interpretive law in rendering its decision.0 7

101.
102.

103.
104.
105.
"obscure
106.
107.

75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705(c).
Id. at § 1705(d).

Id. at § 1702.
Becker, 74 Lanc. L. Rev. at 81.
See Braddee v. Brownfield, 2 Watts & Serg. 271, 278 (Pa. 1841) (construing an
and ambiguous" Act of Assembly).
Becker, 74 Lanc. L. Rev. at 80 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 500.3135 (1973)).
The Limited Tort Amendment was not drawn from a uniform law, and therefore not

affected by 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1922.
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Prior to 1986, Michigan courts had held that the definition of
"1serious injury" was one of statutory construction. 8 The Michigan
Supreme Court reversed this position in the case of DiFranco v.
Pickard 9 and held that the question of what constituted a "serious
injury" was solely a question for the trier of fact when reasonable minds
might differ as to whether the injury satisfied the threshold."0 The
Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas adopted the more recent
Michigan interpretation as its own."'
The Michigan Supreme Court in DiFrancoreached its decision by
scrutinizing the legislative history of the Michigan No-Fault Act and, in
particular, by examining the fate of the bill in the Michigan Senate.
While the bill was under consideration, a Michigan state senator proposed
three amendments that would have amended the threshold requirements
for allowing recovery under the "limited tort" alternative and made it
more difficult to bring suit. 12 None of the three amendments was
ultimately adopted.'
Further debate ensued in the legislature, and a member of the
Michigan House of Representatives entered into the record portions of an
article from the Detroit News describing a "tug-of-war" among different
lobbyists." 4 The article stated that the language contained in the
impairment clause was the "key" to the ultimate fate of the proposed
legislation and that the insurance company lobbyists wanted the clause to
contain an exception for "significant body functions" whereas the
lawyers' lobbyists did not want the word "significant" in the law because
it would make lawsuits thereunder more difficult to maintain." 5 The
final language of the bill did not contain the qualifier of "significant" to
the serious injury exception, and because the Michigan legislature rejected
proposals which would have made it much more difficult to sue for
noneconomic damages, the Michigan Supreme Court in DiFranco
concluded that the legislature did not intend to limit recovery to
catastrophically injured persons." 6 This decision represented an about-

108. See, e.g., Cassidy v. McGovern, 330 N.W.2d 22 (Mich. 1982); see also Denson v.
Garrison, 378 N.W.2d 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Franz v. Woods, 377 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding that the statute requires objective manifestation of serious injury, and that
pain and suffering is not such a manifestation).
109. 398 N.W.2d 896 (Mich. 1986).
110. Becker, 74 Lanc. L. Rev. at 82.
111. Id.at 83.
112. DiFranco, 398 N.W.2d at 902-03 (citing 1972 J.Mich. Senate, 1275, 1380, 1390).
113. 1972 J. Mich. Senate 1391.
114. Id.at2831.
115. Id.
116. DiFranco, 398 N.W.2d at904.
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face by the Michigan courts, and Pennsylvania courts have adopted the
later interpretation.
In general, Pennsylvania courts interpret an insurance statute liberally
in order to effectuate its purpose. 117 Even so, the case of Becker v.
Harple rests at the nadir of liberal construction and judicial reliance on
legislative history. The facially ambiguous Pennsylvania Limited Tort
Amendment was construed with reference to the legislative history of the
Michigan statute from which it was copied. Although this is a clever
modus of interpretation, it works an injustice upon the citizens of
Pennsylvania. No legal fiction is more fantastical than the proposition
that an ordinary citizen is conversant with the legislative history of a state
other than his own. Can anyone really argue that with respect to such a
statute a citizen is reasonably apprised of his rights under the law?
Certainly not. From the standpoint of the private citizen, it is
unimportant if an ambiguous statute can be construed with reference to
legislative history of another state or not. The ordinary citizen demands
that each case be adjudged on its merits and that each statute be applied
according to its language. Thus, there arises the necessity for pure
common law in the absence of unambiguous statutory law. When the
legislature has not acted within the boundaries of its power, the courts
should not pick up the various pieces of legislative unconstitutionality in
an attempt to create a constitutional whole. Rather, courts should be
unfettered to fashion remedies that account for the equities of each
situation.
To spur the General Assembly into action, courts must declare
statutes such as the Limited Tort Amendment unconstitutional.
Otherwise, legislators will be content to allow the courts to construe
ambiguous statutes in any way at all and claim before their constituents
that they attempted to remedy a problem through legislation, but that the
courts have skewed the legislation. If, however, courts invalidate vague
legislation, legislators will have to explain to their constituencies why this
has happened. Constitutional political accountability will be restored.
VI. Application of the Traditional Test for Vagueness to Ambiguous
Legislation
If a portion of a statute admits more than one reasonable
interpretation, the General Assembly has passed an illusory bill and that
portion of the statute should be given no effect. In the realm of public

117. Freeze v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Antanovich
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 467 A.2d 345 (1983), aft#d, 488 A.2d 571 (Pa. 1985).
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laws, there is a simple solution. Courts should be free to construe all
public law against the Commonwealth. Contract law has long recognized
the doctrine of contra proferentem, which requires that all documents be
construed most strictly against the party proffering the writing in
question."' If a provision of an insurance contract is ambiguous, the
policy provision is to be construed in favor of the insured and against the
insurer, the drafter of the agreement." 9 The analogous principle to
apply to public laws enacted by the sovereign is the principle of contra
regem-- no commonwealth legislation that is ambiguous can be given any
effect upon its subjects. 2 Courts have already adopted a similar rule
in certain situations. For instance, if the intent of the legislature is
unclear in imposing double taxation, there is a presumption against such
a legislative purpose, which can only be overcome by express statutory
language. 2 '
But sometimes, such as in the Becker case, the state has regulated
conduct among private individuals, and the sovereign has no real interest
against which a statute can be construed. Thus, a construction against
either party would not achieve the goal of the principle of contra regem.
In such cases courts should declare the statute prospectively invalid. To
prevent injustice, the courts should weigh the equities of the parties who
relied upon a statute before it was declared unconstitutional and craft a
remedy which in its judgment is appropriate. This remedy should result
from an exercise of pure judicial wisdom and be unfettered by legislative
history.
The Statutory Construction Act adds even more confusion to the
proper construction of statutes by purporting to establish a split standard
of construction depending on the nature of the matter addressed by a
piece of legislation.'2 2 An insurance statute is liberally interpreted to
effectuate its purpose,'2 3 while a statute with penal provisions is strictly
construed.124 Yet this double standard of review further obscures the

118. See, e.g., Rusiski v. Pribonic, 515 A.2d 507 (Pa. 1986); Central Transp., Inc. v. Board
of Assessment Appeals of Cambria Co., 417 A.2d 144 (Pa. 1980); In re Breyer's Estate, 379
A.2d 1305 (Pa. 1977); Van Horn v. Kenn, 127 A. 233 (Pa. 1925).
119. J. Kinderman & Sons, Inc. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 857, 859 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (citing Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563 (Pa.
1983)).
120. This leads to legal uncertainty when statutes regulate conduct between private parties.
For a proposed solution to this uncertainty, see supra Part IV.
121. Estate of Rose, 348 A.2d 113, 118 (Pa. 1975) (citations omitted).
122. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928(b)(1).
123. Freeze, 603 A.2d at 598 (citing Antanovich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 467 A.2d 345 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983), aff'd, 488 A.2d 571 (Pa. 1985)).
124. Id. (citing Smith v. Harelysville Ins. Co., 418 A.2d 705, 706 (1980)).
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nature of the binding laws of the Commonwealth for it frustrates any
attempt by the citizenry
of Pennsylvania to ascertain the effect of
25
legislative enactments.
It is elementary that certain issues of federal due process apply in
criminal proceedings that do not apply in civil proceedings. But the
difference of proceeding does not a priorinecessitate a different standard
of review of statutes. Because all legislation is governmental action and
affects the rights of individuals in some way, there is no logical reason
why different types of legislation should receive different scrutiny. An
infringement on freedom, either through incarceration, regulation, or
taxation, is an infringement of individual liberty. Strict construction is
not an unworkable standard. If such specificity can be achieved for penal
provisions,' 26 statutes regulating civil matters can also achieve such
specificity.
Yet for some reason, this reality has been overlooked. Perhaps in
an effort to comply with the mandates of federal due process with respect
to criminal statutes, the Pennsylvania courts have forgotten the state
constitutional mandate of strict construction for all statutes. 127 Once
again, this requirement arises from the constitutional dictates that all
statutes be construed according to their language, that such language
admit of only one reasonable interpretation, and that statutory
construction be solely a matter of judicial responsibility.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized the United States
Supreme Court's articulation of three ways in which a statute may be
challenged as unconstitutionally vague. First, the statute may trap the
innocent by failing to give a person of ordinary intelligence reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly.
Second, the statute may result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
in the absence of explicit guidelines for their application. Finally, where

125. In some instances, courts have even looked to legislative history to determine the
meaning of criminal statutes. See Commonwealth v. French, 611 A.2d .175 (Pa. 1992) (holding
that use of Official Comment to Crimes Code is proper where it was available to the General
Assembly five years before the Crimes Code was enacted); see also Commonwealth v. Wooten,
545 A.2d 876 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 321 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1974).
126. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nesbit, 575 A.2d 633 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating that a
statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it contains reasonable standards to guide prospective
conduct), appeal denied, 584 A.2d 315 (1990), cert. denied sub nom. Nesbit v. Pennsylvania,
11I S. Ct. 2039 (1991).
127. This author equates "strict construction" with the requirement that a statute admit of
only one reasonable construction. This may not be a perfect equation, but because the strict
construction standard has been proven effective, it is probable that, given the somewhat
elusivenature of language, statutes that pass this test are as close to singularity of expression as
possible.
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freedoms, it may inhibit
the statute implicates first amendment
28
constitutionally protected activity.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has declined to hold statutes
unconstitutionally vague except in rare instances.' 29 Moreover, the
Court has evidenced a strong presumption in favor of statutory
constitutionality and will not declare a statute invalid under the
Pennsylvania Constitution unless it "clearly,palpably,andplainlyviolates
the Constitution." 3 But the United States Supreme Court has held that
a basic principle of due process dictates that if the prohibitions of an
enactment are not clearly defined, the enactment is unconstitutionally
vague."3 '
Because the Pennsylvania Constitution requires a statute to be
construed on its language alone, it is axiomatic that for such bill to be
vital it must be singular in expression. Inherent in the concept of a "bill"
is ascertainable substance. If a bill admits more than one reasonable
interpretation, then a court following the traditional rules of Pennsylvania
statutory construction will choose between or among the various
As already noted, such a choice results in an
interpretations.
unconstitutional binding act of volition by a member of the judiciary-- the
branch of the government not vested with general law-making authority.
Therefore, a prohibition of vagueness must necessarily inhere in the
Pennsylvania constitutional requirement that no law be passed except by
bill. 132
In recent years, the courts have unconstitutionally assumed great
legislative power and practiced law-making in a way probably unwittingly
presaged by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court of the Nineteenth Century.
The Supreme Court then feared that the judiciary would be too hasty to

128. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 108-09 (1972); In re William L., 383 A.2d
1228, 1232 (Pa. 1978). But see Commonwealth v. Nesbit, 575 A.2d 633 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990),
Nesbit v. Pennsylvania, 11 S.Ct. 2039 (1972)
appealdenied, 584 A.2d 315, cert. denied sub noma.
(articulating test for statute with penal provisions as 1) if the statute is vague on its face,
measured against hypothetical conduct that the language could arguably embrace, or 2) if the
language is vague regarding the particular conduct of the individual challenging the statute);
Oppenheim v. Commonwealth, 459 A.2d 1208 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
129. But see In re William L., 383 A.2d at 1228; Nesbit, 575 A.2d at 633.
130. Id.at 1231 (emphasis in original); Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency,
331 A.2d 198, 205 (1975) (quoting Daly v. Hemphill, 191 A.2d 835, 840 (1963))
131. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109.
132. We should not weep at the passing of a statute. It will not work the same catastrophic
hardship on our republic if a statute is declared invalid than if a constitutional provision is
ignored. In recognition of the extreme gravity of constitutional provisions, Chief Justice Marshall
in the famous case of McCullough v. Maryland stated, "[W]e must never forget, that it is a
constitution we are expounding." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). He did not state, "We
must never forget that it is a statute we are expounding."
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interpose its will for that of the legislature-- that court rulings in cases
based on the personal judgments of reviewing judges would lead to
"latitudinarian authority133which might be abused" and be "dangerous to the
well being of society."'
Pennsylvania courts in the late Twentieth Century have assumed an
unconstitutional quantum of legislative power by failing to hold
legislation to the high standard of specificity required by the republican
form of government inherent in the Pennsylvania Constitution. The
General Assembly has enacted laws that are so ambiguous that they can
be salvaged only by an activist judiciary, and the General Assembly has
even placed its imprimatur upon such activism by directing courts to
construe provisions of a statute in conjunction with a whole host of
external factors, many of which have never been passed upon by the
legislature in conformity with the Constitution. 134
The argument against a change in interpretive methods is that an
expansion of the vagueness doctrine would injure private parties who
have relied upon laws that are subsequently declared unconstitutionally
vague. But in such situations, the courts can apply or fashion common
law to provide answers where the legislature has been silent or
ambiguous. A resort to legislative history is unfair because legislative
history is at best a collection of several individual expression of will,
rather than a single general expression.' 35 The common law, however,
though subject to some uncertainties, is regulated by the doctrine of stare
decisis and changes slowly. Moreover, if the need arises, common law
can be manipulated by the courts to conform to various factual situations.
It is better that a judge mold the law to meet the equities of a given
situation than that the same judge look to highly imperfect and perhaps
intentionally skewed legislative histories 36 to try to reach a result when
none can be reasonably deduced from constitutionally passed bills.
The fear expressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court long ago that
the courts would infringe on the realm of the legislature has not led to
"collisions between the legislative and judicial departments. "37 Rather,
it has led to collusions between the two departments. It is politically
expedient for the legislature to pass vague legislation that election-proof
judges can construe as they wish. The legislature can bypass the

133.

See Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 2 Rawle 369 (Pa. 1830).

134.

1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928(c).

135. For an interesting attack on the singularity of legislative intent, see Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Congress is a "They," not an "It," 12 INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 239-87 (1992).
136. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
137. See Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 2 Rawle 369, 373 (Pa. 1830).
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constitutional requisites for passing laws and use the courts as the
scapegoat if the legislation proves to be unpopular. Members of the
judiciary in Pennsylvania must only stand for retention vote once every
ten years.. and are therefore only indirectly accountable to the
citizenry. Only when the legislature is restrained by the judiciary will the
citizenry once again regain control of the rudder of public policy.
VII. Conclusion
The essential proposition of this Comment is that statutory
construction is not merely a creature of statute. It is regulated by the
Pennsylvania Constitution. All other rules of statutory construction must
fit within the parameters of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The language
of the Constitution emphasizes that all laws must be voted on by a
majority of both legislative houses, for "[n]o law shall be passed except
by bill."' 39 The Constitution is equally emphatic in preventing the
legislature from imposing statutory interpretation upon the courts without
enacting language that would give rise to such interpretation. 40
Committee reports, statements by individual legislators and even
concurrent resolutions of the House and Senate should not be equated
with legislation for they do not sport the same pedigree. They have not
been passed by both houses and signed by the Governor. Therefore, they
are of no more constitutional significance than a suggested interpretation
articulated in an amicus curiae brief submitted to a reviewing court.
Courts must reclaim their power of statutory construction from the
General Assembly. To begin, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court must
declare the Statutory Construction Act unconstitutional. Its purpose is
irreconcilable with the role of the judiciary under the Pennsylvania
Constitution.' 4
The approach to statutory construction advanced in this Comment
would retard the legislative process, but would improve the quality of
legislation produced. The potential benefit is clear: unambiguous
legislation which can be understood by men of ordinary intelligence. If
the General Assembly enacts ambiguous legislation, courts should be
courageous and declare such legislation unconstitutional. This will
compel the legislature to meet the constitutional requirements for
efficacy: unambiguous language, and no effect beyond the language.
Courts must take the first step for the legislature by nature favors

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3152, 5153.
139. PA. CONST. art. III, § I.
140. PA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
141. See I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921.
138.
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ambiguous legislation. When the courts take this step, the widespread
passage of vague legislation with its apparent imprimatur for judicial
legislation will come to an end. This step is necessary to restore the
constitutional balance.
Aaron D. Martin

1069

